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Abstract 
 
Economics promotes market mechanisms for the efficient use of 
resources in satisfying human want, yet market mechanisms are 
apparently unable to provide adequate health care and thereby 
satisfy a need central to a person’s well-being. This research 
report looks at the views of Amartya Sen and particularly his 
ideas of distributive justice and capability. It also considers some 
of the insights that economics provides for an understanding of 
the apparent limitations that occur in health care provision. The 
findings point towards a curtailed view of what may reasonably be 
obtained and a recognition that only limited agreement on any 
arrangement for health care provision may be possible within 
society. Sen’s capability approach provides a pertinent and 
expansive measure of a person’s well-being and freedom; it 
should not be ignored in any evaluation of well-being or the 
acceptability of any policy purporting to improve well-being.  
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Preface 
 
The primary aim of this research is to add to the conversation 
concerning distributive justice in health care by elucidating 
complexities that make a simple combination of ethics and 
economic theory inadequate, and to attempt to bring ethics and 
economic theory closer together. The approach is to examine 
economics and welfare, to consider insights provided by the 
thoughts and theories of Amartya Sen, and to consider some of 
the welfare aspects of health care.  
 
It is self-evident that health is central to a person’s well-being. It is 
therefore a very special part of considerations of welfare. Health 
care is only one aspect of health, but without adequate healthcare 
very real suffering can ensue. It is therefore within the ambit of 
ethics to be concerned with health care provision. 
 
Ethics is concerned with right action – what is the right thing to 
do; what ought to be done. For health care to be available to 
those who need it, and when they need it, is not simple task. 
There are many layers of organization that are necessary to 
provide even simple levels of health care. From administration, to 
procurement, to distribution, to training of professionals, the 
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diverse and complex nature of the task is apparent. These 
functions can be done well or badly. Health care can be efficient, 
equitable and effective or it may not. Consequently, ethical 
concerns and concerns of distributive justice are relevant. The 
economic imperative – that people have infinite needs and finite 
resources, seems especially apparent. The question therefore is 
one of the right things to do, for individuals and for society. Does 
the much-hyped market mechanism of delivering goods and 
services provide a good model for health care? Should equality 
be pursued for its own sake, or do the very poor deserve more 
assistance, more welfare, than others? Clearly a societal 
obligation is felt – charities provide some of the needed medical 
care, and it is generally accepted that public health and welfare of 
some description should be provided to those with a certain level 
of need and also in an emergency regardless of ability to pay. 
How best then to consider ideas of and action for distributive 
justice? 
 
During the 1950’s-1960’s Kenneth Arrow developed Social 
Choice Theory1, which shows the difficulty of obtaining any 
consensus for group decisions and is therefore pertinent if society 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘the subject of social choice theory was revived in its modern form by 
Kenneth Arrow around 1950 … he also gave the subject its name’ (Sen 2009: 
92). 	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is to make decisions for arrangements for distributive justice.  
Arrow was also interested in healthcare and in 1963 put forward 
the special characteristics of health care that allow it to defy a 
normal supply and demand mechanism. This was articulated in 
his 1963 publication Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of 
Medical Care.  
 
Further insight into the health care market was given by George 
Akerlof. He published a “revolutionary paper in 1970” showing 
that “if one party to a deal has inside information and the other 
does not” the problems created are “profound and dramatic” 
(Harford 2006: 112). These are the specific characteristics of 
health care insurance and they effect the provision of health care. 
 
Economics may enable objective insight into the functioning of 
the markets. However if the economics of health care escapes 
the supposed rationality of the market mechanism agreement 
may be difficult to obtain Furthermore in any normative 
pronouncement, economics is not excluded from the influence of 
value judgements. An agreement even on the correct ethical 
concerns in distributive justice may be elusive. Sen’s views 
relating to justice and the means of obtaining it are pertinent to 
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these ethical and economic concerns particularly with reference 
to healthcare. 
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Chapter 1  
An introduction to Amartya Sen:  ‘Nobel Prize Laureate’ 
 
In an autobiography written at the time of the award of his Nobel 
Prize for Economics, Sen describes how events and experiences 
in his early life contributed to his awareness of the effects of 
social disparities, and later influenced the direction of his 
research. The following is drawn from that autobiography 
 
Sen was born in 1933 into the pluralist society that was India. His 
early schooling2 had nurtured diversity of thought and culture, and 
encouraged openness to new ideas. When sectarian violence 
erupted in the mid 1940s, he was devastated by the killing of a 
Muslim labourer in his own, mainly Hindu, neighbourhood. It was 
shocking for him to learn that it was extreme poverty that had 
forced the man to venture into an area, unsafe for him, in search 
of income. The violence also alerted him to the divisiveness that 
communitarian politics could hide. Likewise, the Bengal famine of 
1943 had an impact on him. Neither he, nor any one he knew, 
starved, but two to three million people died, mostly those who 
were placed at the lowest rungs of the economic ladder such as 
landless rural labourers.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 At Visva Bharati, in Santiniketan.	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On leaving school, Sen proceeded to Presidency College in 
Calcutta to study economics. He was there from 1951-53 and 
found constant reminders of economic misery. Sen felt that he 
had already established an understanding of the plurality of 
cultural identity before arriving at Presidency College, but at 
Calcutta his lifetime concerns became apparent: welfare 
economics, economic inequality and poverty, and importantly the 
scope and possibility of rational, tolerant, and democratic social 
choice. Formal work on these areas came later. 
 
In 1953, he moved Trinity College, Cambridge, again to study 
economics. Cambridge was alive with intense debates between 
different schools of economic thought, especially the conflict 
between those who supported ‘Keynesian economics’3 and the 
‘neo-classical’4 economists. After Trinity Sen returned to Calcutta 
where at the young age of 23, he was appointed to a chair in 
economics at Jadavpur University, while still completing his PhD 
thesis at Cambridge. He thereafter returned to Cambridge to 
study philosophy. After completing these studies he again 
returned to India. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Keynesian economics refers to an economic theory stating that active 
government intervention in the marketplace and monetary policy is the best 
method of ensuring economic growth and stability (Mohr 2000: 579) 	  
4 Neo-classical economics: an approach to economics that relates supply and 
demand to an individual’s rationality and his or her ability to maximize utility or 
profit (Weintraub: 1993).	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From 1963 – 71, he was Professor of Economics at the Delhi 
School of Economics, where he immersed himself in research 
into social choice theory. Social choice theory relates to 
aggregation in economic assessment and policy making, and this 
is related to poverty, inequality, unemployment, real national 
income and living standards. His work Collective Choice and 
Social Welfare, published in 1970, was an effort to take an overall 
view of social choice theory.  
 
From 1971, at the London School of Economics, Sen resumed 
work on social choice theory. He also worked on economic and 
social appraisals for “measuring economic inequality, judging 
poverty, evaluating projects, analyzing unemployment, 
investigating the principles and implications of liberty and rights 
[and] assessing gender inequality” (Sen 1998a: 6). By the mid-
1980s, Sen’s work became more involved in “trying to understand 
the nature of individual advantage in terms of the substantive 
freedoms that different persons respectively enjoy, in the form of 
the capability to achieve valuable things” (Ibid: 7). During this time 
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he published Choice, Welfare and Measurement, in 1982 and 
Resources, Values and Development, in 19845. 
 
In the late 1980s Sen moved to Harvard. Among other areas of 
interest he pursued the idea of ‘capabilities’. This was part of a 
continuing search to understand individual advantage, which 
depends upon many factors including social opportunities and 
influences. Capability determines how people manage to live the 
life they choose and have reason to value - including the freedom 
people have to choose the life they have chosen.  This position 
was put forth in his 1985 publication Commodities and 
Capabilities.  
 
Amartya Sen wrote his autobiography from which the above 
information was gleaned in 1998 at the time of his Nobel Prize. 
Sen also relates in his autobiography the divisive nature of 
economic theory – the argument between those who hold with a 
Keynesian view of economic theory and those who are more of a 
‘neo-classical’ persuasion. This is an ongoing division that has 
not yet been settled, and does not even include other differently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Both books were collections of articles he had published in journals in the 
1979s and early 1980s.	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nuanced views. Welfare is viewed differently from each of these 
perspectives. 
 
Sen’s continuing interest in and study of individual advantage and 
justice has culminated in his latest publication The Idea of Justice 
(2009), in which he draws together from his previous work and 
from the ideas and the insights of others a comprehensive view of 
justice and capability. The ideas put forward in The Idea of 
Justice particularly that of capability, are relevant to ethical 
decisions in distributive justice and health care and will be 
explored further. 
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Chapter 2 
Economics and distributive justice: some views 
 
Economics is a social science and can been defined as the 
“practical and theoretical science of the production and 
distribution of wealth” (Sykes 1982: 328). The subject matter of 
economics is individuals, society, and their material welfare. The 
study and analysis of production, distribution and exchange of 
goods and services requires analysis of the actions and 
behaviour of individuals and groups and how these lead to the 
development or destruction of wealth.  
 
There are subdivisions in the science of economics e.g. 
macroeconomics, microeconomics, business economics, 
healthcare economics. Of particular interest to ideas of 
economics as they relate to distributive justice are positive 
economics and welfare economics, which present two contrasting 
positions. 
 
Positive economics 
“Positive economics views the economy as a system susceptible 
to analysis in ways similar to those used in the natural sciences” 
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and “is concerned with the logical implications derivable from a 
set of initial assumptions” (O’Connell 1982: 1). 
  
Welfare economics 
Welfare economics, a branch of normative economics6, is 
concerned with social welfare, and is “a varying blend of positive 
and normative economics” (ibid: 2). If social welfare is to be 
improved then a measure is needed to assess what is to be 
improved. The way in which social welfare is measured 
distinguishes Neoclassical (“Old”) welfare economics from “New” 
welfare economics.  
 
Neoclassical (“Old”) Welfare economics7 
Welfare economics can be traced to Jeremy Bentham. His use of 
the moral and political philosophy, Utilitarianism, provided the 
measures of Utility for determining policies for social welfare that 
should, according to Bentham, be used to guide legislation (Gray 
1995: 28). This was Neoclassical (“Old”) Welfare economics8, 
based on the idea that individuals have similar utility functions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Normative economics embodies value judgements that are the motivating 
factors for policy recommendations (Wilber: 2004). 	  
7 Neoclassical welfare economics is not the same as neoclassical economics. 
Neoclassical economics is what is generally called ‘economics’ – the accepted 
orthodox view of economics (Weintraub 1993: 2).	  
8 This is referred to by Paul Samuelson (1947) as “ethical hedonism”. Those 
who developed this approach include Pigou, Bentham, Sidgwick, Edgeworth 
and Marshall (O’Connell 1982: 4).	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that are in some way quantifiable. Social welfare could be thought 
of as the sum of individual utility functions (O’Connell 1982: 5)9. 
Bentham’s Utilitarianism was transmitted into public life, thereby 
resulting in interventionist social policies and inspiring reforms in 
public health, the civil service and local government (Gray 1995: 
29).  
 
Utilitarianism gradually fell from favour as comparisons of 
personal utility came to be considered unscientific10. Distributional 
issues are also not considered in the measure of the total utility of 
a community; this is of particular concern to Sen in his rejection of 
utilitarianism. 
 
“New Welfare Economics”  
“New” Welfare economics developed away from utilitarianism, 
utility measurements and value judgements, to concerns of 
“efficiency” and “equity”. Vilfredo Pareto (1909) determined that 
efficiency “would be achieved when it would not be possible to 
improve any one person’s well-being without adversely affecting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Every additional consumption of a commodity will give smaller and smaller 
increases in utility – the law of diminishing utility.	  
10 “Economists came to be persuaded by arguments presented by Lionel 
Robbins and others (deeply influenced by “logical positivist philosophy”) that 
interpersonal comparisons of utility had no scientific basis”. Because of this, 
Sen (1998a :182) argues that ‘the epistemic foundations of utilitarian welfare 
were seen as incurably defective.’	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that of someone else” at such a point “there could be no net gains 
or improvements for anyone in society” (O’Connell 1982: 5). As 
an allocative mechanism, the Pareto criterion does not depend on 
utility measurements, to ensure efficiency it “requires that no 
potential improvements be possible” (ibid). 
 
Equity is concerned with how the products of society are 
distributed ethically and therefore involve questions of income 
distribution and social choice (ibid). More recently cost-benefit 
analysis, and the possibility of making social welfare judgements 
on the basis of national income, and social indicator research 
have approached the measurement of social welfare from 
different perspectives (Fleurbaey 2008: 8). Social choice theory 
and Sen’s capability approach have also influenced thinking on 
social welfare judgements. 
 
Whatever measurement approach is taken, welfare economics’ 
focus remains one of changing the status quo from what is to 
something deemed to be better. There appears then to be at the 
outset an is-ought dichotomy. Positive economics, which enquires 
into the economic states and processes, versus welfare 
economics, which would prescribe what economic states and 
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processes should be altered, by some means, to improve social 
welfare11. 
 
Positive Economics vs. Welfare Economics 
Welfare economics is a long way from the economics of Adam 
Smith (1723-1790), often referred to as “the founding father of 
economics” (Rasmussen 2010: 1). Smith was first and foremost a 
moral philosopher and ethicist12, but in “The Wealth of Nations” 
published in 1776, he explored the causes of prosperity, which 
led to the establishment of economics as a science. He coined 
the phrase “the invisible hand”13 describing the multitudes of 
individual economic activities, based on personal advantage, 
which lead to the overall well-being of society. His oft repeated 
and poetic explanation captures his position:  
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or 
the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their 
regard to their own interest (Smith 1776: 508).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Frankena’s classic work in which he clearly explains Hume’s is-ought 
distinction, commonly referred to as the ‘Naturalistic Fallacy”. Frankena, W.  
1939. The Naturalistic Fallacy. Mind, New Series, 48(192): 464-477.  
12 Adam Smith was a professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University 
(1752-1763), first publishing his other great work Theory of Moral Sentiments 
in 1759 .	  
13 “By directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of 
greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other 
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention” (Smith 1776: 423).	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It can be said that Adam Smith identified capital accumulation, 
free trade, an appropriate – but circumscribed – role for 
government and the rule of law as keys to national prosperity. 
(Greenspan 2007: 261). Most importantly, he was the first to 
emphasize personal initiative. 
The natural effort of every individual to better his own 
condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and 
security is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and 
without any assistance … capable of carrying on the society 
to wealth and prosperity (Smith 1776: 14).  
 
Jeremy Bentham was an admirer of Adam Smith and, despite 
utilitarianisms interventionist tendencies, he surprisingly remained 
“a strong advocate of laissez faire14 in economic policy” (Gray 
1995: 28). John Stuart Mill moved further from this position. In 
Principles of Political Economy Mill makes a distinction “between 
the laws of production of wealth – which are real laws of nature, 
dependent on the properties of objects – and the modes of 
distribution, which, subject to certain conditions, depend on 
human will” (Mill: 1848). By holding that distributive arrangements 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Laissez faire: French for “Let (people) so (as they choose).” It describes a 
system or point of view that opposes regulation or interference by the 
government in economic affairs beyond the minimum necessary to allow the 
free enterprise system to operate according to its own laws” (Hirsch et al: 
2002). 
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are a matter of social choice, he does not recognize that 
productive and distributive activities are inextricably mixed (Gray 
1995: 29). The idea that distribution is a matter of choice, 
somehow disjointed from the ‘invisible hand’ idea of Adams, 
allows a view of welfare economics to exist apart from positive 
economics – the ‘ought’ view, as opposed to the ‘is’ view of 
economic interactions. This welfare view is one of values, 
choices, and interventionist policies, without necessarily 
appreciating the effect interventionist policies have on distribution 
and production itself.  
 
Bentham, his follower James Mill and Mill’s son John Stuart Mill 
effectively broke with the liberal tradition (ibid: 30), initiating a 
divide from the freedom expounded by Smith and the liberal 
views of the Enlightenment and legitimising interventionist actions 
by government. Interventionist policies of whatever form must 
provide a limiting factor to the freedom to pursue one’s own 
interest in one’s own way. A consensus regarding the true value 
of welfare economics has not emerged. There is a continuing 
tension between those who oppose the free market position with 
a desire to do good and those who support it as a force for good. 
The conflict between the Keynesian and neo-classical economists 
at Cambridge (that Sen discusses in his autobiography) reflects a 
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similar dichotomy then, and likewise the tension exists in The 
Idea of Justice in Sen’s discussion of concepts of freedom, the 
role of the state, democracy and individual well-being. 
 
Freedom and Liberty 
Adam Smith’s basic insight is given form by those who favour a 
free market with a minimal role for government. The working 
hypothesis stems from the observation that the free market 
produces order: despite the superficial chaos of billions of 
transactions between people, there is generally an agreement 
between supply and demand – neither excess demand, visible by 
lengthy queues and waiting times, nor excess supply, visible as 
huge unsold stock, are prominent features of a market economy. 
This Basic Walrasian Conjecture may be stated more formally: 
The laissez faire operation of the price mechanism, in an 
environment of deregulated competitive markets where 
agents are motivated by self-interest, will produce not chaos 
but coherence, in the sense of market clearing15, optimal 
outcomes (Bryant 2009: 3). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Market clearing is based on the famous law of supply and demand. Kling 
(2010: 1)  explains it as ...“ Economic theory says that the price of something 
will tend toward a point where the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity 
supplied. This is the market clearing price because it “clears away” any excess 
supply or excess demand.” 	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The belief is that the market mechanism will deliver the greatest 
possible wealth and well-being to all. The largest possible 
quantity of goods will be produced at the lowest possible price, to 
the benefit of all. 
 
The opposing belief is that markets on their own cannot deliver 
the most desirable outcomes. This is reflected in those who 
advocate active government intervention in the economy itself 
and monetary policy to ensure an optimum outcome16.  For 
considerations of distributive justice, the observed success of the 
free market system may argue for a more laissez faire approach, 
however the presence of desperate and destitute people in 
society militates against just leaving it to the market mechanism. 
To stand idly by neglects a sense of duty and a moral imperative 
to help others.  
 
There are therefore strong forces in favour of welfare in some 
form or another and not on total reliance on the implicit value of a 
free market. It seems ethically unacceptable to leave the 
vulnerable to the supposed efficiency of the market system, yet it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This is labelled Keynesian or neo-Keynesian, after John Maynard Keynes 
who advocated for government intervention.	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also seems ethically unacceptable to interfere excessively in the 
market system and risk reducing the welfare of all.  
 
The political philosopher and economist John Gray (1995:69) 
provides three interesting insights into what is at stake between 
the liberal idea of freedom and interventionist policies, which he 
argues is the way in which welfare economics must be 
implemented.  
 
Firstly, it is freedom itself that is at stake.  
The case for market freedoms has been set out in part in 
terms of efficiency and clear failures of planning [that is 
central planning by government] to deliver promised goods, 
but the fundamental argument is one that invokes individual 
freedom itself. 
 
Secondly, it is the “liberty-preserving role” of the markets 
themselves that matters and "not economizing on scarce 
means to known ends”. Gray (ibid: 67) asserts that the central 
problem: 
 ... as of economic theory properly understood, is the 
division of knowledge in society – the problem of how the 
knowledge that is dispersed or diffused among millions of 
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economic agents, and known in its totality to no one, can be 
rendered accessible to many. This is the true role of the 
market process: not economizing on scarce means to 
known ends, but rather generating through the price 
mechanism information as to how economic agents ignorant 
of each other may best attain equally unknown purposes. 
The task of the market is, then, that of a discovery 
procedure for identifying and transmitting to others data 
about the infinitely complex structure of preferences and 
resources in society. 
 
Thirdly, the supposed problem of utilizing scarce resources 
with maximum cost-efficiency is fallible.  
It presupposes that the purposes or goals of the 
organization and of its members may be ranked in a 
hierarchy of importance by reference to which the 
distribution of resources may then be determined. In … the 
economic life of many organizations in a whole society – 
there is no agreed hierarchy of ends and there is no 
authoritative allocator of resources (ibid: 67). 
 
A final caution from Gray (ibid: 69) warns us that  
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Every governmental intervention has real costs, and there is 
strong evidence that the vagaries of governmental policy 
constitute the chief source of economic disturbance in 
recent decades. It is a general truth … that the imperfections 
of the market are never sufficient to justify intervention in the 
absence of careful consideration of the corollary reality of 
government failure. 
 
Welfare economics at the least may compromise freedom, 
interfere with the market and reduce the overall benefits that the 
market provides such as the free flow of information -especially 
by the price mechanism - allowing individuals to attain their own 
purposes and in so doing, if Adam Smith’s view is taken, increase 
the wealth of the nation.  
 
Whatever type of improvement welfare economics is aiming at, 
the compromise to freedom and benefit is a consideration not to 
be ignored. Sen is concerned with freedom. He describes the 
difference between freedom as process and freedom as outcome. 
A person’s advantage is not represented solely in terms of what 
that person achieves. A person’s advantage may be better 
reflected by the agency freedom that the person has to make 
personal choices.  The “agency aspect” the ability to form goals, 
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make commitments, have values – and the “well-being aspect” 
may be related, but they are still distinct.  
 
Sen (1999: 6) also puts forth the case in defence of free markets: 
To be generically against markets would be as odd as being 
generically against conversations between people … The 
freedom to exchange words, goods and gifts doesn’t need 
justification in terms of their favourable but distant effects; 
they are a part of the way human beings in society live and 
interact with each other (unless stopped by regulation or 
fiat). 
 
Sen echoes the observation that ‘there is no agreed hierarchy of 
ends’ and also emphasises partial rankings and interpersonal 
comparisons. 
 
Sen’s development of the idea of Capabilities during the 1980s 
sought to view the compromises to freedom and well-being that 
have an affect on advantage and welfare from the point of view of 
the individual. He rejects an approach to welfare that 
concentrates on utility as the only source of value, and also on 
individual happiness as a useful measure. One’s happiness may 
be relative to expectations due to circumstances, and the 
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hopelessly deprived may lack the courage to desire much and 
may be happy with a very little improvement in their lives.  
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Chapter 3 
Economics – some scrutiny  
 
Economic man and rational choice theory 
Despite his background in economics and his general recognition 
of the value of free markets, Sen criticizes a central assumption of 
economics that people always act to maximize their own welfare. 
This is described in Rational Choice Theory which is rejected by 
Sen for reflecting “an extremely limited understanding of reason 
and rationality (Sen 2009: 179). ‘Economic man’ is not ‘rational 
man’ and rational choice theory does not capture the full 
spectrum of choices made by individuals. 
 
‘Economic man’ is shorthand for the type of rational man that 
economics has described for its purposes. Being a rational 
maximizer of well-being, the economic man concept is used by 
economists to predict behaviour and to assess rationality. It is 
predictive, because by calculating what choices maximize 
supposed well-being, predictions of economic behaviour may be 
made or guessed at. It is a criterion of rationality, because it 
determines what norms must be followed for choice to be seen as 
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rational17 (Sen 2009: 175). Economics has re-defined rationality 
and limited its meaning, creating a circular argument. If a person 
is rational they are said to behave as would economic man, by 
maximising self-benefit; a person who maximises self-benefit is 
said to be rational and therefore behaves as the idea of economic 
man would predict. The evidence does not accord. 
 
‘Economic man’ in many ways describes people’s actual 
behaviour as unsatisfactorily as a stick-figure drawing represents 
their appearances. There are many characteristics that do not fit 
this representation. Sen reminds us that ‘the completely egoistic 
human being was not always dominant in economic thought. He 
gives as an example the reasons Adam Smith offers for going 
against the dictates of self-love: sympathy, generosity and public 
spirit. He quotes from The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in which 
Smith (1759: 191) describes these virtues: 
Sympathy: the most humane actions require no self-denial, 
no self-command, no great exertion of a sense of priority ... 
and ... consist only in doing what this exquisite sympathy 
would of its own accord prompt us to do ... Generosity: 
when we sacrifice some great and important interest of our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Sen (2009: 175) quotes John Elster in Reason and Rationality: ‘the rational 
actor is one who acts for sufficient reason’.	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own to an equal interest of a friend or of a superior ... Public 
spirit: ‘when he compares those two objects with one 
another, he does not view them in the light in which they 
naturally appear to himself, but in that in which they appear 
to the nation he fights for.  
 
Sen (2009: 187) is critical of the fact that modern economics has 
in the main favoured a simplistic view of motivations, ignoring all 
motivations other that the pursuit of self-interest, and that ‘rational 
choice theory’ has determined that this uniform view of human 
behaviour is termed rational. 
 
Rational Choice Theory is the idea that people choose rationality 
if and only if they pursue their self-interest. Rational Choice 
Theory is closely aligned to the concept of economic man dictates 
that those who do not choose to maximize their own welfare are 
acting irrationally.  
 
Again Sen disagrees with this simplification, because Rational 
Choice Theory reflects  “an extremely limited understanding of 
reason and rationality” (Sen 2009: 179). As he (ibid: 32) puts it, “A 
person may have well-thought-out reasons other than the 
promotion of personal gain for acting in a socially decent way”.  
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An explanation of ‘economic man’ 
Sen (ibid: 177) provides us with reasons that are offered for 
maintaining the fiction of the ‘economic man’: 
a. As a general rule it is close enough to the truth, despite some 
well-known divergence 
b. It is useful in making predictions 
c. The assumed behaviour is “good enough” for the task it is 
being used for.  
 
Sen refers to others who have offered explanations as to why 
actual choices are not always seemingly rational. For example, 
Herbert Simon introduced the term ‘bounded rationality’ to explain 
that people generally don’t make rational decisions – possibly 
because of obtaining insufficient information, not being alert, or 
focussed (Sen 2009: 176). Another reason is offered to excuse 
this deviation from rationality: ‘weakness of will’ or ‘insufficient 
self-command’ (ibid). 
 
Sen rejects these views as inadequate because he considers that 
rationality is greater than this view of rational man. The 
deficiencies of economic man are in many ways similar to those 
of utility for the assessment of a person’s well-being because it 
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ignores the distinction between the “agency-aspect” and the “well-
being” aspect of a person.  
 
The inadequacy of economic man and the assumptions made by 
economics may simplify economic enquiry without undermining 
the validity of its conclusions, but in considerations of welfare that 
involve social choice or redistribution of income the language of 
‘economic man’ and economic pronouncements appear to reflect 
less than the complete picture. How actual economies function is 
still not settled: neo-classical vs. neo-Keynesian debates 
continue. Because the variables are huge and the whole 
economy is the subject of debate, hypotheses are not testable. A 
‘general equilibrium theory” that would explain the functioning of 
the whole economy remains a theory. Economic theory is on 
more stable ground when smaller markets are concerned. At a 
micro-economic level – individuals, groups, firms, industries, 
hypotheses become testable. Notwithstanding Sen’s cautions on 
the infallibility of Rational Choice Theory, economics is most 
scientific at this level. Welfare is local in its concerns, right down 
to regions, families and individuals. Microeconomic knowledge is 
therefore not superfluous to concerns of welfare, it cannot 
realistically be neglected in searching for ways and means to 
improve welfare. 
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Rational man  
Rational man is so much more than economic man. For Smith 
(1759: 190) ‘prudence’ was ‘of all virtues that which is most 
helpful to the individual’ … ‘humanity, justice, generosity, and 
public spirit are the qualities most useful to others (These are 
valued by Sen as part of rational man, who can also be 
considerate of the desires and pursuits of others. Different, but 
rational decisions may be made for many different types of 
reasons. People with quite different perspectives -  ‘from the 
dedicated altruist to the reasoned seeker of personal gain’ - may 
make quite varied, but still rational decisions. For Sen, rationality 
is a matter of basing choices on reasoning that can be sustained 
over time and subjected to scrutiny. There may be a plurality of 
reasons, all rational, all leading to different choices. These 
therefore leave the principle of self-interest maximisation as an 
inadequate identifier of choice. 
 
For the reasons Sen has illuminated, there is good reason for 
discretion in accepting economic assertions when they are based 
on assumptions of rational (in the guise of maximisation of self-
interest) behaviour. 
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Social choice theory 
Having denied the authenticity of the type of rationality defined by 
the ‘economic man’ concept, the maximization idea cannot be 
appropriate as a gauge of the choices that groups of people and 
society make. This is not unexpected - obtaining a consensus 
from a number of people is usually quite difficult and can’t be 
done by a simple summation of whatever would give a 
maximization of personal gain. As an example of this Sen (1998a: 
1) opens his Nobel lecture with a discussion of a camel – 
sometimes described as a horse designed by a committee, which 
reflects the somewhat confused results that are not unexpected 
from committees when trying to reach a group consensus.  
 
The search for a rational and defensible procedure for reaching 
group decisions that would include everyone’s point of view 
began with the work of Marie de Condorcet18, an eighteenth 
century Enlightenment thinker. His most important work was on 
probability and the philosophy of mathematics and his treatise, an 
Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority 
Decisions (1785) contributed to the development of the theory of 
probability (O'Connell 1996: 1-2). In search of procedures for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 His full name was Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritet, Marquis de 
Concorcet and he was one of the intellectual leaders of the French Revolution.	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social choice that could be seen as avoiding arbitrariness and 
instability he developed what is now known as the Condorcet 
Paradox. This shows that majority rule can be inconsistent, with a 
majority preferring A to B, and a majority preferring B to C, and a 
majority preferring C to A (ibid). 
 
These are pessimistic results and illustrate the difficulty of finding 
an aggregate assessment based on individual priorities, and 
therefore the difficulty of the comparative approach which is 
central to social choice theory. 
 
So how can we accommodate diverse choices and individual 
priorities in processes of social choice? Condorcet was the first 
contributor to what is now called “Social Choice Theory”. Kenneth 
Arrow re-examined social choice and in 1951 developed what has 
become known as the ‘Impossibility theorem’19. Arrow recognized 
the need to set limits on which conditions should be satisfied to 
be acceptable in any social decision procedure.  
He set four conditions: (1) Pareto efficiency, (2) ‘nondicatorship’ 
(decisions are not dominated by any one person, and each 
person is able to make independent choices), (3) independence 
(demanding that social choice over any set of alternatives must 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 It was at first called the ‘General Possibility Theorem’	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depend on preferences only over those alternatives), and (4) 
unrestricted domain (requiring that social preference must be a 
complete ordering, with full transitivity, and that this must work for 
every conceivable set of individual preferences). The reason that 
this theorem became known as Arrow’s impossibility theorem was 
because it demonstrated that it is impossible to satisfy these 
conditions simultaneously (Sen, 1998b: 183).  
 
As Sen (2009: 93) explains, Arrow’s impossibility theorem “shows 
that even some very mild conditions of reasonable sensitivity of 
decisions to what the members of a society want cannot be 
simultaneously satisfied by any social choice procedure that can 
be described as rational and democratic”. Sen shows faith in 
mathematical reasoning by declaring that common sense or 
informal reasoning could not anticipate Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem. Arrow’s theorem may again be a pessimistic finding, but 
the joke about a camel being a horse designed by a committee 
reveals that intuitively this is not a complete surprise – a group or 
committee decision may well be expected to have an odd 
outcome.  
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The Liberal Paradox: The impossibility of the Paretian liberal, 
another impossibility theorem:  
Sen followed on Arrow’s impossibility theorem with another: the 
liberal paradox, also called the impossibility of the Paretian 
liberal: ‘if people can have any preferences they like, then the 
formal demands of Pareto optimality may conflict with some 
minimal demands of personal liberty’. 
 
The example Sen gives to explain this liberal paradox involves a 
pornographic book and two possible readers, ‘Prude’ and ‘Lewd’. 
Prude hates the book and would not like to read it, but would hate 
it even more if Lewd were to read it. Lewd would love to read the 
book, but would prefer even more that Prude read it. A liberty-
based case would have Lewd read the book but not Prude – 
which is what each of them would choose to do. However Prude 
and Lewd would prefer Prude to read the book to Lewd reading 
the book. So the liberty-based option of Lewd reading the book 
goes against the Pareto principle judged by what they would both 
like. This is the liberal paradox – the impossibility of 
simultaneously satisfying both principles.20 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This sounds much like the old proverb “you can’t have your cake and eat it, 
too!”	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Impossibility is not the end of social choice 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the impossibility of the Paretian 
liberal are for Sen the starting point of public discussion. These 
theorems bring into focus questions that would otherwise not be 
raised. Social choice theory in this way encourages public 
discussion and attempts to clarify issues.  
 
Robert Nozick (1974) does just that and his discussion gives 
support to the ideal of limits within a liberal framework that can 
still support a liberal view of freedom. Nozick’s (ibid: 166) insight 
into the impossibility of the Paretian liberal explains and describes 
the real constraints on freedom that are present in society. He 
explains individual’s rights as ‘co-possible’ – “each person may 
exercise his rights as he chooses”, and this “fixes” some features 
of the world:  
Rights do not determine social ordering but instead set the 
constraints within which a social choice is made, by 
excluding certain alternatives, fixing others and so on … 
Even if all possible alternatives are ordered first, apart from 
anyone’s rights, the situation is not changed: for then the 
highest ranked alternative that is not excluded by 
anyone’s exercise of his rights is instituted. Rights do not 
determine the position of an alternative or the relative 
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position of two alternatives in a social ordering; they operate 
upon a social ordering to constrain the choice it can yield 
...If entitlements to holdings are rights to dispose of them, 
then social choice must take place within the constraints of 
how people choose to exercise these rights. 
 
This gives an explanation of the way liberty is experienced in a 
society – choices within a social reality that imposes constraints 
on liberty. 
 
Somewhere between the disorganization of a bazaar and the 
tyranny of a dictatorship there is the muddle of group decisions – 
Sen’s committee horse that turns out to be a camel – and the 
operation of the market.  Sen’s central concern in the Idea of 
Justice is the muddle of group decisions; he does not give the 
market any particular attention. In a sense it is, in the way he 
describes the market as similar to conversation, just a given. Sen 
dismissed the concept of economic man as not sufficient for 
explaining the full spectrum of possible decision-making. A 
complete ordering of preferences is found to also be 
unacceptable for social consensus. There is a plurality of reasons 
and possibilities and incomplete orderings of possible social 
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choice and it is with the acknowledgement of these factors that an 
idea of justice might be pursued. 
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Chapter 4 
Amartya Sen: justice in the abstract; justice in the concrete; 
capability 
 
Sen identifies two basic, but different ways of reasoning about 
justice, both before and since the European Enlightenment 
period. On the basis of this distinction he divides those thinkers 
and philosophers concerned with justice into two camps. The one 
he calls transcendental institutionalism and the other realization-
focused comparison.  
 
Transcendental Institutionalism 
In the transcendental institutionalist group are those searching for 
ideal institutions. Included here are Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. Their 
ideas and concepts of justice are focussed on contractarian or 
institutional arrangements in the belief that these will result in a 
just society.  
 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) presented the sovereign state as 
necessary, because without it there would be a state of nature 
and “a war of every man, against every man”… and man’s life 
would be “solitary, poor, nasty brutish and short” (Flew 1984: 
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150). John Locke (1632-1704) introduced the idea of a ‘social 
contract’, the function of which is “to form a civil society in which 
men may enjoy their natural rights under a government 
established to enforce laws protecting those rights and to 
adjudicate disputes” (ibid: 204)21. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-
1778), published The Social Contract in 1762, in which he 
developed the idea of the “general will” which is directed at the 
public good, such that “the delicate balance between the supreme 
authority of the state and the rights of individual citizens is based 
on a social compact that protects society against factions and 
gross differences in wealth and privilege among its members 
(Delaney, 2005)22.  
 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) called his own philosophical position 
“transcendental idealism” with emphasis on a priori reasoning. He 
developed the categorical imperative: “Act only on that maxim 
which you can at the same time will to become a universal law” 
(Flew 1984: 189-193). John Rawls (1921- 2002) again uses the 
social contract, and devises a hypothetical, non-historical ‘original 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In Locke’s Second Treatise of Government there is a “commitment to natural 
rights, the rule of law, the function of the state as the guarantor of these 
conditions, and the rule of the majority”. These “were powerful ideas that 
helped to shape both the American and French Revolutions and provided the 
key concepts for the development of liberal democracy”(Flew 1984: 207)	  
22 There is a tension between Liberalism and Communitarianism	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position’ from which it can be negotiated, behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’ (ibid: 299). 
 
Sen discerns in all of these approaches to justice the 
characteristics of transcendental institutionalism: the pursuit of 
just institutional arrangements for society, and the pursuit of 
perfect justice. He decries these pursuits when they are the 
central exercise in theories of justice. Although the pursuit of 
perfectly just ideal states may be intellectually very interesting, he 
believes that it is not directly relevant to the problem of making an 
actual choice. Despite grouping the above philosophers together 
it becomes apparent that it is the complex approach to justice and 
to institutions developed by John Rawls, which epitomize for Sen 
the transcendental institutionalism that he is arguing against. 
 
Realization-focused comparison 
Sen declares that the transformational properties of realization-
focused comparison are more relevant to justice. Adam Smith, 
the Marquis de Condorcet, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill 
all discussed earlier because of their roles in the development of 
economics, utilitarianism and social choice are included here 
because Sen discerns their interest to be in justice in the society 
and the world in which they lived. Adam Smith (1723-90) was a 
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Scottish political economist and philosopher, who was interested 
in logic and ethics. He wrote about morality and general welfare 
(ibid: 327). He published Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759 and 
Wealth of Nations in 1776. The Marquis de Condorcet (1743-
1794), as previously discussed, was a pioneer of social choice 
theory. The Condorcet Paradox seems to be a precursor of the 
Impossibility Theorem developed much later (1951) by Kenneth 
Arrow. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was a leading utilitarian, but 
also “an influential advocate of reform – legal, political, social, and 
educational” (ibid: 41). John Stuart Mill (1806-73), English 
empiricist philosopher and social reformer, who “modified the 
Utilitarianism of Bentham … and attempted to show that men’s 
notions of obligation can be made compatible with the greatest 
happiness principle” (ibid: 231). 
 
Sen also includes Mary Wollstonecraft and Karl Marx in this 
group. Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) was an Anglo-Irish 
feminist, intellectual and writer, who wrote a Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman, advocating equality of the sexes (Kreis 2009: 
1). Karl Marx (1818–1883) was a German social theorist who was 
interested in economics and history, whose dialectic is an account 
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of socio-political history (Flew 1984: 221)23.  The writings of 
Wollstonecraft and Karl Marx can be identified with advocating 
changes in social conditions, their roles, though not necessarily 
direct and not fully apparent in their lifetimes, can be perceived as 
part of a continuum of social reorganizations. Wollstonecraft 
being associated with feminism and Marx with socialism 
 
Despite each proposing quite different ways of making social 
comparisons, Sen asserts that they were all involved one way or 
another in comparisons of societies that already existed or could 
feasibly emerge; their primary concerns being the removal of 
manifest injustice from the real world. Sen avers that the 
identification of injustice and its amelioration may be done without 
recourse to developing ideal institutions. Realization-focused 
comparison is more in tune with the problems of injustice found in 
the world. 
 
Comparison approaches are primarily concerned with social 
realizations. It is relatively easy to identify injustice and unfairness 
and it may be ameliorated without recourse to developing ideal 
institutions. True to his commitment to plurality of reasons and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Marxism: (may be distinguished from Karl Marx himself), it is “the body of 
doctrines originally propounded by Marx and Engels, known as dialectical 
materialism” (Flew 1984: 221)	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necessity of making choices, Sen does not feel precluded him 
from drawing on insights from the approach of transcendental 
institutionalism. Sen also includes the possibility of resolving 
transcendental and comparative issues simultaneously and calls 
this a ‘conglomerate theory’24. A conglomerate theory however 
might be a more precise description of the ideas he develops, 
because he does not completely abandon the Rawlsian 
approach, and accepts in large part many of the concerns and 
reasoning of Rawls. To appreciate this departure Rawls’ 
approach is examined in more depth. 
 
John Rawls 
John Rawls, “arguably the most important political philosopher of 
the 20th century”, had a “life-long project of finding coherent and 
attractive way of combining freedom and equality in to one 
conception of political justice” (Richardson 2005: 1). 
  
Rawls was looking for a just way for society to arrange its 
institutions. He developed the strategy of  ‘the original position’ as 
a thought experiment. In the original position citizens negotiate for 
a fair and just society, but through representatives who operate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Sen does not pursue this because he sees the standard theories of justice 
as associated with transcendental identification, and the types of judgement 
needed for this transcendental identification and comparative assessment do 
not follow from each other (Sen 2009: 16).	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under a veil of ignorance so that the representatives do not know 
the details of the person they represent. These devices are to 
ensure the negotiation of principles that are fair for all, and can be 
publicly endorsed (Wenar 2008: 18). These representatives effect 
an ‘impartial’ role, that is similar to that of the ‘impartial spectator’ 
developed by Adam Smith and in which Sen finds much value.  
 
Rawls two principles of Justice as Fairness are: 
First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a 
fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is 
compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; 
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy 
two conditions: 
a. They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; 
b. They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged 
members of society (the difference principle)  (ibid: 13). 
 
The first principle gives priority to liberty and applies to political 
institutions.  The second principle has two parts that apply to 
social and economic institutions. Fair equality of opportunity 
requires the same educational and economic opportunities for all 
and the difference principle determines that any inequalities of 
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wealth work to the advantage of those who will be worst off (ibid: 
14). This acknowledges economic theory and the ubiquitous 
‘invisible hand’25 without which the benefits, which accrue to all of 
society, would be lost. Sen sees that a “distributional formula of 
prioritizing the interests of the worst-off has to compete with the 
utilitarian formula of maximizing the sum of utilities of all” (Sen 
2009: 198). Sen however rejects these kinds of formulaic 
approach. 
 
In the original position Sen identifies the problem of procedural 
parochialism, a type of ‘group think’. The representatives may 
have, as Sen puts it, “local group prejudices” and the procedure 
precludes later adaptations so that ideas and experiences that 
may not be known at the time and which present themselves later 
or from elsewhere are precluded (ibid: 150-1).  
 
Sen describes the positive lessons from the Rawlsian approach:  
1. Fairness is central to justice, a foundational priority. For 
Sen the impartiality of the original position is not adequate 
for its purpose. 
2. A conception of objectivity must establish a public 
framework of thought sufficient for the concept of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25the ‘invisible hand’ of self interest by which the whole of society benefits.	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judgement to apply and for conclusions to be reached on 
the basis of reasons and evidence after discussion and 
due reflection 
3. ‘The moral powers’ that people have, related to ‘their 
capacity for a sense of justice’ and ‘for a conception of the 
good’ 
4. Prioritization of liberty: the strong case for seeing liberty as 
a separate and, in many ways, overriding concern in the 
assessment of the justice of social arrangements 
5. The need for procedural fairness 
6. Attention is drawn particularly to the predicament of the 
worst-off people. 
7. Sen’s own reading of Rawls: the importance of human 
freedom in giving people real – as distinct from only 
formally recognised – opportunity to do what they would 
like with their own lives. (ibid: 62-5). 
 
These are factors relevant to a pursuit of justice. They influence 
the degree of capability that a person has, in pursuing a life that 
they would wish to have. 
 
Yet Sen does still reject transcendental institutionalism as 
informative but insufficient for a description of social justice 
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because “if a theory of justice is to guide reasoned choice of 
policies, strategies or institutions, then the identification of fully 
just social arrangements is neither necessary nor sufficient” (ibid: 
15). He does not believe however that his position is very far 
removed from Rawls. He later avers that to move to actual 
assessment of freedom and capabilities would not be a 
foundational departure from Rawls’ programme, but mainly an 
adjustment of the strategy of practical reason (ibid: 66). 
 
Sen moves to develop not principles or ideal institutions but a 
Plurality of Reasons for Social Justice. He develops the concepts 
of freedom, incompleteness, impartiality, and public reasoning, 
among others, that contribute to social justice. Instead of denying 
the inescapable complexity of any decision making procedure, 
and searching for a simple axiomatic tool to determine policy or 
choices, he advocates that the complexities must be elucidated, 
exposed, discussed and worked with, all in the pursuit of justice. 
He therefore advocates public discussion and education as part 
of the way forward in improving justice.  
 
The complexities must be grasped and included, not as 
distractions from the central pursuit, or rule, or thesis, or 
institutional arrangement or ideal of welfare, but as part of the 
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project itself, of developing capabilities. Capability is important in 
the sense that benefit is derived not from a system’s ability to 
deliver (some service or good), but a person's ability to choose to 
access this service or good (whether or not a choice is 
exercised). This is a ‘bottom-up’ approach instead of a ‘top-down’ 
approach. Capability becomes a measure of a person’s well-
being, the capability to improve a person’s own situation 
according to that person’s own desires.  
 
Sen’s Framework for Reasoning26 
Plural grounding of Justice: Plurality of Reasons 
The plurality of reasons for justice is important and inescapable. 
Sen provides a captivating example of the “possible sustainability 
of plural and competing reasons for justice” (ibid: 12): 
Which of three children – Anne, Bob and Carla – should get 
a flute about which they are quarrelling? 
-Anne claims the flute on the ground that she is the only one 
of the three who knows how to play it (the others do not 
deny this) 
-Bob claims the flute on the ground that he is the only one 
among the three who is so poor that he has no toys of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Many of these contributions to a framework for reasoning are included under 
the title “Social Choice as a Framework for Reasoning” (Sen 2009: 106.	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own (the others concede they are richer and have plenty of 
toys) 
-Carla claims the flute because she has been working 
diligently for many months to make the flute with her own 
labour (the others confirm this) (ibid: 13). 
 
Depending on the point of view, a utilitarian or economic 
egalitarian, or libertarian might be persuaded differently by the 
arguments. Each would be pursuing an idea of justice, but it is 
apparent that each view has a claim for fairness. Plurality of 
unbiased principles reflects the fact that impartiality can occur in 
many different ways. Plurality of values is inescapably present in 
social judgement. Plurality of reasons are present in reasoning 
and public reasoning. 
 
Plurality aspect of freedom  
Freedom is not a simple concept and can be scrutinized in 
different ways, because there are several distinct features within 
the idea of freedom. 
 
The freedom to choose and determine the way we live our lives, 
is part of the value of our lives. It is not just the life we lead, but 
also the freedom to choose that life that gives it value. There are 
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two distinct aspects to freedom – one is opportunity and the other 
is process. Opportunity is related to the outcome, what is actually 
done. Process is related to the choice itself, which leads to the 
outcome. More freedom gives us more opportunity to pursue our 
objectives - to live as we would like, to achieve what we value. 
Process is part of the choice - we are not being forced into some 
state because of constraints imposed by others. This leads to a 
distinction between ‘culmination outcome’ and ‘process outcome’, 
the outcomes may be the same, but in the ‘process outcome’ 
there was choice, which becomes part of the value of the 
outcome. If there was no freedom in the choice (because of 
coercion to do a particular thing), the ‘culmination outcome’ might 
appear to be the same, because the outcome looks the same, but 
it is not the same as ‘process outcome’, which includes free 
choice. Being free to pursue one’s own ends may include the 
freedom of being able to bring about one’s reasoned choice, 
(always supposing the person has an adequate opportunity to 
reason). It may include the opportunity of reasoned assent by 
direct control (through one’s own actions) and indirect control and 
effective power through others, (friends, doctors, attorneys). 
 
Freedom may be limited just by the possibility of another’s 
arbitrary power, which could interfere with a person’s freedom. 
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This arbitrary power, just by existing compromises a person’s 
liberty, even if no coercion is ever used. 27 
 
Sen sees human rights as embodiments of freedoms that society 
has affirmed. These freedoms must be important in themselves, 
and by being declared ‘human rights’ they are affirmed and 
recognised as important freedoms by society. Freedoms cannot 
become human rights unless they reach a ‘threshold of 
relevance’, by which Sen means that they must be freedoms that 
can be influenced through social help. Rights can include 
processes and opportunities.  
 
Capability 
The concept of capability is a consolidation of Sen’s views on 
justice. It attends to the actual freedoms and abilities of a person 
to choose the life that they would wish. Capability is “an aspect of 
freedom”. Freedom is something of value in itself and as a means 
to other things of value. The freedom to choose our lives can 
make a significant contribution to our well-being, but beyond well-
being, the freedom itself may be seen as important, apart from its 
contribution to well-being. The capability approach includes not 
just what a person actually ends up doing, but also on what that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This is a Republican concept or neo-Roman idea of freedom	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person is in fact able to do, whether or not the choice is made. 
Capability is closely aligned to agency, which encompasses all 
the goals that a person has reason to adopt. It is not just the 
outcome – achieving a particular goal, but also the freedom to 
choose to achieve that outcome, which counts for a capability 
approach. Well-being may be just one of many goals that the free 
agent may adopt, and it may not even be the most important. 
Capability is engendered if the individual is free to pursue well-
being and free to pursue all the goals that he or she has reason 
to value.  
 
An important aspect of capability is that “in valuing a person’s 
ability to take part in the life of the society, there is an implicit 
valuation of the life of the society itself” (Sen 2009: 246).  
 
Incompleteness 
After the findings of de Condorcet and Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem, social choice theory allows for incompleteness of 
judgements in social justice. Assertive incompleteness is the 
incompleteness recognized by a theory of justice, while tentative 
incompleteness may relate to operational difficulties28.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 E.g limitations of knowledge, complexity of calculation, Herbert Simon’s 
‘bounded rationality’ previously discussed under economic man.	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Impartiality 
The just resolution of a problem requires the qualities of 
perspective, rationality and balance. Adam Smith’s ‘impartial 
spectator’ is the objective form of impartiality that Sen favours. It 
is a device that encourages a dispassionate and objective 
consideration of a problem, and does not exclude any relevant 
considerations  
 
Public Reasoning and Democracy 
Sen advocates agreement, based on public reasoning, on 
rankings of alternatives that can be realized. Sen promotes the 
view that democracy is not limited to balloting on voting day. It is 
‘government by discussion’ thereby including political participation 
and dialogue. He also agrees with John Rawls’ view that  ‘the 
exercise of public reason’ is part of democracy. Public reasoning 
includes open impartiality.  
 
Conclusion 
Sen’s approach to justice is one of realization-focussed 
comparison; he is concerned with social realizations and the 
resolution of injustices. Although recognising the insights that a 
pursuit of perfectly just institutions and perfect justice may have, 
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these add to the plurality of reasons for justice, they are 
necessary but not sufficient in the pursuit of justice. The 
appropriate starting point is not “What would be perfectly just 
institution?” but “How would justice be advanced?” Realization-
focussed comparison uses the concept of capability to evaluate 
the actual freedoms and abilities a person has to live the life they 
might choose. A more just society would have increased its 
members capability. Capability includes well-being and agency 
freedom. Public reasoning, which is part of democracy, must be 
concerned with capability, and must be pursued with impartiality 
and must recognize the importance of making political room for 
the incompleteness of social judgements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   61	  
Chapter 5 
Medical care – a special case 
 
Good health is fundamental to a person’s ability to experience 
life, as he or she would wish. Capability includes ‘well-being 
freedom’ and therefore in Sen’s idea of justice, the freedom and 
ability to pursue one’s own good health and well-being is part of 
one’s capability function. Society’s arrangements for health-care 
are therefore significant factors in the promotion of people’s well-
being and well-being freedom. 
 
Resources are always limited in any area of human need, but the 
effect of this can be particularly cruel in medical care. 
Arrangements that reduce the optimal use of resources are of 
particular concern, as shortages of equipment, medicines, 
hospitals and clinics have direct effects; efficiency and equity 
concerns are acutely significant. Pareto efficiency and distribution 
concerns cannot easily be ignored29. 
 
There is no settled consensus of the best arrangement for health-
care, which is a most glaring example of a social choice problem.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Pareto efficiency is “achieved when it would not be possible to improve any 
one person’s well-being without adversely affecting that of someone else; there 
could be no net gains or improvements for anyone in society”(O’Connell 
1982:5).	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Savedoff (2004: 140) puts it thus: 
“Spending on health services has increased dramatically in 
all the world’s high- and middle-income countries30, leading 
to increased concerns about cost-containment, quality and 
responsiveness. Many of these countries, even if they have 
predominantly public systems, have introduced more market 
elements to relieve pressure on public services or to 
encourage greater productivity and allocative efficiency. 
Tensions in developing countries run high, as rising 
aspirations continue to outstrip the local resources available 
to meet them. Countries in Latin America – which had hoped 
to follow the western European models of social insurance 
expansion – have been blocked by the slow expansion of 
the formal labour market and low productivity in public 
institutions. In most of Asia, private fee-for-service 
arrangements continue to dominate, with few insurance 
products emerging. The former communist nations of 
eastern Europe and central Asia are dealing with the 
collapse of national health services and turning to social 
insurance arrangements, while African countries are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Savedoff is referring to increases in speding since the early 1960s; Arrows 
article was published in 1963.	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struggling under extremely limited resources and increasing 
disease burdens, notably from the spread of HIV/AIDS.”  
 
As might be expected when looking at all the diverse ‘states of 
play’ in medical provision arrangements around the world, the 
issues can be complex, highly emotive and expensive. The 
likelihood of ‘incompleteness of social judgements’ seems high 
and is borne out by Savedoff’s examples. ‘Impartiality’ and ‘public 
reasoning’ may be insufficient to obtain a social consensus. That 
comprehensive and judicious reasoning can be all-important, is 
not denied by Sen:  
“Informal insights, important as they are, cannot replace the 
formal investigations that are needed to examine the 
congruity and cogency of combinations of values and 
apparently plausible demands.” “Our deeply felt, real-world 
concerns have to be substantively integrated with the 
analytical use of formal mathematical reasoning” (Sen 
1998b: 184). 
 
The question, “How would justice be advanced in health care?” 
might be answered by another question: “Does the market have a 
solution?” To which the answer might be, “sort-of”. 
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Kenneth Arrow’s 1963 paper, “The Uncertainty of the Welfare 
Economics of Medical Care”, became one of the most widely 
cited articles in the field of health economics, and marked the 
creation of the health economics as a discipline (Savedoff 2004: 
139). As Arrow (1963: 1) was careful to point out, his subject is 
“the medical-care industry, not health”. As he correctly points out 
medical-care is only one of the causal factors in health, nutrition, 
shelter, clothing, and sanitation may be much more significant 
(ibid). Sen would also include factors such as social organization, 
the nature of schooling and education, the extent of social 
cohesion and harmony.  
 
Arrow’s point of departure is the desirability of a competitive 
market, because of the economic efficiency that it can deliver; 
failure by one or more of the competitive pre-conditions31 for a 
competitive market would reduce welfare below the best 
obtainable from existing resources and technology, in the sense 
of a failure to reach an optimal state in the sense of Pareto” 
(Arrow 1963: 1). Unfortunately, this turns out to be the case for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Arrow identifies three “major competitive preconditions” which  
1. the existence of competitive equilibrium 
2. the marketability of all goods and services relevant to costs and utilities 
3. non increasing returns 
1. and 2. Insure optimal competitive equilibrium 
3. insures that every optimal state is the competitive equilibrium corresponding 
to some distribution of income 	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medical-care. Because of the special nature of health-care a 
competitive market does not exist in the way that a market exists 
for other commodities. This special nature Arrow declares is due 
to uncertainty. Because of uncertainty there is no market for some 
of the risks involved in health care. Because of uncertainty there 
is also imperfect marketability of information. (As John Gray 
suggested the market is really about innumerable pieces of 
information being conveyed by means of price between interested 
parties). 
 
George Akerlof further illuminated the special features of health-
care and his insight also related to uncertainty, in the form of 
asymmetric information (Akerlof 1970: 488-500). Akerlof’s 
example was the used car market; he titled his article The Market 
for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
‘lemon’ being shorthand for poor quality. Uncertainty is a feature 
of medical care, in the predictability of recovery, and the various 
risks. Akerlof’s ‘lemons’ refer to the insurance industry’s difficulty 
in assessing the level of risk involved, and the problem of inside 
information – in which one party knows more than the other. 
Those who are likely to need insurance will be most likely to seek 
it – these are the ‘lemons’. Those who are not ‘lemons’ in this 
sense are less likely to want insurance. Therefore a certain 
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amount of self-selection occurs: those most expecting medical 
care are more likely to seek insurance. His conclusions concur 
with Arrow’s. With uncertainty and asymmetrical information, it is 
possible that there will be no market to insure risk.  
 
The overwhelming problem for the market provision of medical 
care is the way in which this inside information tends to destroy 
insurance markets. At the point where premiums have become 
excessively high only those who most need insurance will be 
interested in purchasing it. However the premiums will approach 
the actual cost of the medical care so this is hardly insurance – a 
situation in which no insurance market actually exists. That they 
exist relates more to legislation and employment practice. 
Because medical cover is also linked to employment it assists in 
maintaining the viability of health cover, because the healthy are 
obliged to buy health cover packaged with their job (Harford 
2006: 125). In South Africa the prescribed minimum benefits, and 
legal difficulty medical aids have of denying anyone cover and the 
inclusion of medical cover in remuneration packages, also 
supports this kind of insurance. However there is still the 
tendency of the young and healthy not to insure themselves 
thereby reducing the pool of income for the medical insurance 
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companies. This does not suggest itself as a good long-term 
model.  
 
Patently this does not mean that medical care does not occur – 
clearly it does. It occurs however without the efficient allocation of 
resources that a competitive market provides. Arrow asserts that 
virtually all the special features of health care provision stem from 
the prevalence of uncertainty which rules out a competitive 
market. In its place there are “compensatory institutional changes 
with some reinforcement from usual profit motives, [which] largely 
explain the observed non-competitive behaviour of the medical-
care market, behaviour which, in itself, interferes with 
optimality”(Arrow, 1963: 2). 
 
The Special Characteristics of the Medical-Care Market  
According to Arrow (1963: 4), the particular characteristics of the 
medical-care market establish a special place for medical care in 
economic analysis. He identifies these characteristics to be: 
1. Irregular and unpredictable demand; demand associated 
with an assault on personal integrity. Illness is risky and 
costly in itself, apart from the cost of medical care. 
2. Expected behaviour of physicians – because the product 
and activity of production are identical, the patient cannot try 
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out what is on offer before consuming it. There must be an 
element of trust, and the physician’s behaviour is expected 
to conform to high ethical standards, not least of which is his 
having concern for the patient’s well-being and a lack of self-
interest. This lack of self-interest must include a lack of 
interest in profit, which, if apparent, would destroy trust. 
3. Intense product uncertainty because of the unpredictability 
of the outcome, and (for the patient) no previous experience 
of the situation. There is also informational inequality, with 
the physician knowing far more that the patient. 
4. Licensing, which restricts supply and therefore increases 
the cost. This is defended as guaranteeing a minimum of 
quality. 
5. Extensive price discrimination by income – with an 
extreme of zero prices for sufficiently indigent patients. 
 
Conclusion 
Because of these special characteristics a free-market 
mechanism is inadequate for health care. As Arrow remarks in his 
‘Postscript’, “the logic and limitation of ideal competitive behaviour 
under uncertainty force us to recognize the incomplete 
description of reality supplied by the impersonal price system” 
(Arrow 1963: 9). Non-market institutions (such as trusts and 
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norms) do compensate for these market failures (Savedoff 2004: 
139), historically religious organisations and charities have also 
stepped in because of the obvious need. There is generally 
widespread support for the government to provide healthcare, 
particularly for those most in need, and for the indigent. Public 
health moreover is also of widespread benefit for “there is every 
reason to suppose that it is considerably more important than all 
other aspects of medical care” (Arrow 1963: 4). 
 
This leads us to real choices in public health policy. The question 
becomes one of choosing the roles that can be effectively played 
by markets and what is best done by non-market institutions 
(Savedoff 2004: 139-140). 
 
Health is core to a person’s capabilities, health care is only one 
contributing factor, but is felt the most keenly, because its 
absence at critical moments can be a matter of life or death or 
debilitation. Health care deserves then the scrutiny it receives.  
The insight provided by economics indicates that arrangements 
for the provision appropriate healthcare cannot be adequately 
provided for by the market forces of supply and demand. 
Furthermore economic analysis does not provide a solution. The 
arrangements are a form of social choice, with all the limitations 
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and inadequacies that are thereby implied. What then can Sen’s 
capability approach offer for health care?  
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Chapter 6 
Sen: Capability and Health Care 
 
In pursuing justice Sen prefers the opening question to be: “How 
would justice be advanced?”, and not: “What would be perfectly 
just institutions?” Considering the special characteristics of health 
care, what might this mean? 
 
Laissez faire not an option 
Arrow and Akerlof both reveal the special nature of health care 
and that it is not amenable to resolution by market forces. This at 
least removes part of the quandary at the centre of welfare 
economics. A laissez faire approach cannot be an option; an 
unregulated free market does not operate in health care, because 
uncertainty prevents the existence of the conditions needed for a 
competitive market (Arrow 1963: 2). This does not however 
remove a central insight of economics: resources are always 
limited. 
 
Limited resources always the case 
Limited resources cannot be wished away and health care 
provision requires extensive resources. A competitive market may 
not be able to determine the supply and demand of health care, 
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but health care provision must still occur within the constraints of 
available resources, which are dependent on such things as the 
strength of the economy and availability of resources. 
 
Social Choice 
Because of limited resources and the limitations of competitive 
markets in healthcare32, health care provision becomes in 
essence a fundamental social choice issue. The social choices 
might be concerned with such things as  
• Opportunity costs – what other social good must be 
foregone to pay for health care costs. 
• Affordability – what can the state reasonably afford to pay 
for. 
• The reach of public health programs – what can and 
should be done by government.  
• Distribution arrangements – how best to provide health 
care to communities. E.g many small clinics, or larger 
district hospitals. 
• What might best be left to the private sector. 
• The most acceptable public-private mix of services.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 specifically in health care provision, because of the presence of uncertainty 
(Arrow: 1963)	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Decisions required in health care provision work at different 
levels. Some involve short-term activity and some are only going 
to have an effect in the long term.  
 
Sen identifies a number of factors that are relevant for a 
framework for reasoning: plural grounding, public reasoning and 
impartiality, capability and well-being freedom. These are all 
relevant to the provision of the health care and are interrelated. 
Sen does not provide a formula for the application of these 
factors, but applying each of the factors to health care assists in 
the reasoning that must inform any social choice. 
 
 
Public Reasoning and Impartiality 
Sen advocates an awareness of the interrelatedness of economic 
performance, social opportunity, political voice and public 
reasoning. (Sen 2009: 350). All of these are significant for health 
care. 
 
Plural grounding 
In health care the possible plurality of reasons for choices and 
also the plurality of options is clear from the many different ways 
in which health care is provided (Savedoff 2004: 140). A 
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comparison approach, looking for ways and means to a better 
outcome, might be more useful than aiming for and falling short of 
ideal, unattainable solutions, particularly in the absence of a 
consensus on what an ideal solution might be. 
 
Capability, well-being freedom 
For Sen searches and debates for a perfectly just distribution 
arrangement are likely to miss the insight that a comparative 
approach might take. The comparative approach asks how justice 
could be advanced in a particular situation. Capability as a 
measure of the benefit and advantage to individuals within groups 
and society, provides a gauge to assess personal situations and 
changes to those situations. 
 
Good health is central to people’s ability to experience life as they 
would wish it to be and is pertinent to the experiences and 
expectations that give life value. It is therefore central in many 
respects to the idea of capability. Good health has been shown to 
be due to a diverse range of factors, including social status, 
nutrition, income, environment, spirituality, social support etc. 
Health care is only part of this, but it is essential at critical 
moments. A person’s health is part of that person’s capability. 
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A Story of a Capability Approach  
Instead of considering this framework in the abstract, a factual 
case of an attempt to use a capability approach provides more 
insight.  
 
Santosh Mehrotra (2008: 405-406) under the title “Democracy, 
decentralization and access to basic services: an elaboration on 
Sen’s capability approach”33 describes the Bamako Initiative, 
begun in 1987:  
Against a background of severe international economic 
recession and financial indebtedness, structural 
adjustment led to a marked reduction in the state’s 
provision of services and a serious disruption to public 
health systems in most of sub-Saharan countries in the 
1980s. Patients seeking care were beginning to pay 
considerable amounts for various treatments. 
In this situation, the Bamako Initiative arose as a 
reasonably successful example of voice in ensuring 
access to affordable essential health services for an 
increasing proportion of people.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Sub-heading “Health: accountability to the community in Sub-Saharan 
Africa” (Mehrotra 2008: 405)	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The Bamako Initiative has shown that organised 
communities can help sustain local public health services, 
not only by contributing financial resources but by having 
‘voice’ in the management of services. The Bamako 
Initiative strategy is to revitalise public health systems by 
decentralising decision-making from the national to the 
district level, instituting community financing and co-
management of a minimum package of essential services 
at the level of the basic health units. The aim is to improve 
services by generating sufficient income to cover some 
local operating costs such as the essential drug supply 
(often imported with donor provided foreign exchange), 
salaries of some support staff, and incentives for health 
workers. Funds generated by community financing do not 
revert to the central treasury but remain in the community 
and are controlled by it through a locally elected health 
committee. Thus, a revolving pool of funds helps to sustain 
the health service. From mere recipients of health care, 
consumers become active partners whose voices count. 
(Mehrotra 2008: 405-6). 
 
Mehrotra states that “mobilising voice in the health sector 
has also helped to rejuvenate health services. “Voice” in 
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this context refers to agency, in that the voices of the 
people count: the people who are to use the system have 
influence over the system itself. They vote for their local 
health committee, their views are taken into consideration. 
The minimum package of essential services is decided by 
this local committee, influenced by the needs of the people 
who voted for them. Health workers responsibilities lie in 
the care of the local people, by whom they can be held to 
account, because it is the local people who are setting 
their incentives. This is the indirect freedom discussed by 
Sen as important: the ability to make the things you want 
to occur happen through others. Likewise the support staff 
whose salaries are paid by the communities of the patients 
they serve, are obligated to the patients and the local 
committee and not to a distant bureaucratic entity. A 
pertinent aspect of Capability in this initiative is agency 
freedom.  
Mehrotra (ibid) further reports: 
The strategy of the Bamako Initiative has, after ten years 
of implementation, in Benin and Guinea, enabled nearly 
half of the population to be regular users of the services 
and raised and sustained immunisation levels close to 
Year 2000 Health for All target levels. Some assessments 
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show that community participation has not been as well 
defined as originally thought, and that significant 
community empowerment has not taken place34. Yet even 
with a weak voice exercised by households and 
communities the outcomes are significant.  
 
For Mehrotra then, “it would appear that voice needs to be 
associated with the retention and use of locally generated 
resources, and that these go to improving the health service and 
achieving sustained outcomes. Greater emphasis needs to be put 
on working with existing local organisations and motivating their 
participation in the running of services.” (ibid).  
 
Of interest too is the significance of an understanding of the 
benefits of microeconomics. The funds that are generated by 
community financing are controlled through the locally elected 
health committee, they do not end up in the central treasury. A 
revolving pool of funds is created which helps sustain the health 
service. The patients and local community have become active 
partners instead of passive recipients of health care. (ibid: 406) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 ‘Induced’ participation, pushed in many cases by donor demand and often 
based on political decisions or bureaucratic simplicities, tends to accentuate 
elite groups in communities, marginalising women and the spontaneous 
organisations that are already formed to cope collectively with local problems.	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Chapter 7.  
Concluding remarks 
 
Capability and Beneficence 
Capability is apt for considering and understanding a person’s 
situation and needs. It helps to focus on the pertinent issues and 
obstacles in place that prevent a person realising his/her own life 
goals. The Idea of Justice looks at justice ‘in situ’. Sen argues that 
improvements in capability are advances in justice; patently 
unjust situations call for remedial action without recourse to 
pursuits of perfect justice and just institutional arrangements.  
 
Sen recommends recourse to public discussion, making political 
room for the acceptance incompleteness of social choices, and 
impartiality as the means to remedying unjust social 
arrangements. Assessing a person’s capability is an authentic 
way of determining their freedom and well-being, and also the 
justice of social arrangements.  
 
One doesn’t need the concept of capability to appreciate that 
good health is fundamental to a person’s well-being and freedom 
to choose and pursue that person’s own life goals. However 
capability provides a comprehensive tool in assessing a person’s 
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ability to achieve health by enjoying a clean environment, having 
adequate nutrition, and being able to access apposite healthcare. 
Not all of these are within an individual’s control and social justice 
should seek to re-dress imbalances. 
 
Tom Beauchamp in assessing capability as an approach to 
justice points out that it could just as well be an approach to 
beneficence (Beauchamp 2008: 12). This seems valid, as 
capability refers to the ability of an individual to pursue all that 
they consider beneficent for themselves – whatever that might be. 
Improving capability is also improving beneficence. 
 
Limitations of Public reasoning and democracy 
Relying on public reasoning and democracy and incomplete 
social choice may be valuable in reaching a consensus or public 
agreement, but there is nothing inherent in these to ensure an 
advancement of justice. De Condorcet’s history perhaps 
illustrates this. His ideas may have been sound and fair and just; 
the Constitution that he wrote for France at the time of its 
Revolution, may have provided a liberal framework for justice and 
fairness that would improve the lot of all. Unfortunately he was a 
poor orator, and could not sway his audience, his Constitution 
was rejected, and he went into hiding and died (possibly at his 
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own hand) (O'Connell 1996: 2). Democracy and public discussion 
may be part of justice, but may not be sufficient to ensure justice. 
Extremes of populism can provide an illogical form of coercion.  
 
Capability for assessment 
As the example of the Bamako Initiative reflects, capability 
provides an effective way of assessing the benefit of changes in 
institutional arrangements. Improving the capability of those who 
require medical care to influence that care leads to beneficial 
effects. Capability is a comprehensive and powerful way of 
assessing any interventions or changes in societal and economic 
arrangements. 
 
Rationality and public-reasoning are not so far removed from 
Enlightenment thinking. In some ways the capability approach, 
although using more subtle, less definite, and more complex 
criteria and processes, is not dissimilar to the use of utility or 
maximum benefit, all with the idea of overall benefit. Economic 
man re-defined rational man as a maximizer of self-benefit. The 
Capability approach re-defines rational man in terms of the 
freedoms needed for self-realization. 
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Transcendental institutionalism and realization-focussed 
comparison. 
Sen rejects transcendental institutionalism as too narrow a focus 
for justice. The ‘how’ of justice is not sufficient, he believes the 
‘what’ gets overlooked in the main or at least improvement in the 
situation on the ground is delayed. The ‘what’ is the situational – 
comparative approach that must be evaluated. This is not an 
easy divide to sustain. Returning to the Bamako Initiative: in this 
case there was a change made to local institutional arrangements 
– this change was towards a more ‘ideal’ arrangement.  
 
Even Sen’s division between transcendental and realization-
focussed comparison may be difficult to sustain. Those he puts 
into the comparative camp, are not deficient in their 
transcendental ideas. Wollstonecraft is looking for universal 
justice – not justice for one group of people only; Bentham’s 
Utilitarianism becomes institutional in its prescriptive reach.  Mill is 
concerned to maintain an over-riding principle of liberty. Marx 
perhaps is the most situational and comparative in his approach 
as his focus is on historical and social change and continual 
social upheaval – not a settled order to society (Wolff 2010: 1). 
Capability itself also fits into these transcendental ideas, an 
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ideally just society improving and equalizing the lives of its 
members, using capability as a yardstick. 
 
Advantages of Sen’s perspective  
Sen has had a lifetime of interest in poverty and welfare 
concerns. Early experiences made this concern personal, but his 
academic work added greatly to general insights, leading to 
public recognition of his contributions, particularly the Nobel prize 
for his work on welfare economics. His perspective avoids 
insisting on absolutes, or fundamentalist principles. Despite much 
elucidation of the various concepts of freedom, he does not give 
freedom in any one particular sense primacy. Sen’s lifetime 
concern with welfare may also have influenced this approach of 
avoiding absolutes. Welfare economics, which aims to improve 
social well-being, must do so by prescribing certain changes 
which effectively interfere with some freedoms, usually economic 
(e.g redistributive policies). Sen’s liberal paradox itself shows a 
pay-off between liberty and efficiency. Policies to alleviate the 
plight of the poor, including health care improvement, involve 
transfers from some part of society to another.  
 
Sen’s caution in his general approach to the weighing of 
desiderata may reflect the general trait in economists to be able 
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to take different views, depending on circumstance. They may 
make a particular pronouncement, but on reflecting how things 
might differ with changed circumstances proceed to balance this 
first pronouncement. Economics is cognizant of the difference 
between short-term and long-term outcomes. There follows a 
qualification often beginning with the words “on the other hand 
……” This has led one politician to quip “give me a one-handed 
economist” – reflecting the difficulty of choice when there is 
imperfect information. Unintended consequences of ‘good ideas’ 
are also well documented in economics, adding to economist’s 
caution and again possibly reflected by Sen’s open-ended 
approach to justice. 
 
Sen asks, “why should we regard hunger, starvation, and medical 
neglect to be invariably less important than the violation of any 
kind of liberty?”… “Liberty must have some kind of priority, but 
total unrestrained priority is almost certainly an overkill” (Sen 
2009: 65).  
 
Apart from the ‘slippery slope’ concern this sounds reasonable. 
However a defence of the primacy of freedom might be found in 
Sen’s assertion that there are no recorded cases of famine in a 
functioning democracy! (ibid: 342-5). Freedom of the press and 
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price movements indicate in advance that there is a looming 
problem. The problem is usually not one of a net shortage of food 
itself, but of the ability of people, usually a sub-group of the whole 
population, to afford food. Democratically accountable 
governments do something to avert catastrophe – it is within their 
ability if they see it as a priority. Even though the numbers 
effected are often relatively small and therefore constitute a small 
percentage of the voting public, concern and outrage by the rest 
of the population spurs on governments to act – a beneficial 
effect of populism in this case. This is one of the great pieces of 
work that Sen has contributed to the world. It nicely encapsulates 
so many of the factors he considers important for society to make 
good choices and enhance its member’s well-being: public 
reasoning, capability, information, democracy. A view of a 
functioning democracy is one in which these freedoms are 
functioning.  
 
Capability describes properly a person’s situation. Measures to 
enhance an individual’s capability give real hope for an 
improvement to their lot. The word should be spread. 
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